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 1935 
“TERMS OF HEART”: JUDICIAL STYLE  
IN OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 
Abstract: The law lives in language. The Supreme Court issues written opinions 
to inform the parties, the bar, and the public of its decision in each case. But the 
content of the decision cannot be divorced from the way it is written—that is, the 
style. Fundamental rights cases present a singular stylistic challenge both because 
they must reduce some ineffable liberty to language, and because they are the 
cases most likely to be read by the public. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 2015 opin-
ion in Obergefell v. Hodges was criticized not only for its outcome, but also for 
its supposedly non-legal style. This Note traces the style of Supreme Court deci-
sions throughout history, and summarizes the reactions to Obergefell in both the 
legal and public audiences. This Note then outlines the Law and Literature 
movement, and argues it is an appropriate lens through which to analyze the style 
of Obergefell. To interpret a judicial opinion, the Law and Literature movement 
looks at two relationships the opinion creates: that with the parties it speaks 
about, and that with its audience. This Note argues that Obergefell exemplifies 
the Law and Literature ideal, by creating an empathetic relationship with its 
plaintiffs and speaking to a reader who values principled decision making over 
technical legal tests. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer and fall of 2015, almost 100,000 gay couples were married 
in the United States.1 That year, the legitimacy of same-sex marriages had fi-
nally been recognized by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision, Oberge-
fell v. Hodges.2 At many of these weddings, that summer and later, the cere-
mony included a reading of a passage from Obergefell.3 As the couple stood at 
an alter ready to begin their lives together, the officiant read Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s words: “No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies 
the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a 
marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.”4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Quentin Fottrell, 1 in 10 Weddings Were Same-Sex Couples in Summer of 2015, MARKETWATCH 
(Nov. 7, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/1-in-10-weddings-were-same-sex-couples-in-
summer-of-2015-2015-11-06 [https://perma.cc/P2S2-SRRL] (noting that 96,000 same-sex couples were 
married between July and October 2015 in the United States). 
 2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 
 3 See Natalie Schachar, Justice Kennedy’s Gay Marriage Opinion Is Celebrated Again—in Wedding 
Vows, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-couples-justice-kennedy-
20150828-story.html [https://perma.cc/2JFS-THBT] (noting the last passage of the Obergefell opinion 
has been used in wedding ceremonies around the country). 
 4 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
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There was something about this passage. On the day the opinion was re-
leased, a screenshot of it went viral on the internet followed by the hashtag 
#lovewins.5 Millennials who had never so much as glanced at the writing of a 
legal opinion before posted it on Facebook and Instagram.6 Journalists, too, 
were captivated, calling the closing paragraph “one of the most beautiful pas-
sages you’ll likely read in a court case.”7 Jia Tolentino, a New Yorker staff 
writer, wrote that on the day the opinion was released, she was so ecstatic she 
went to a club, took psychedelic mushrooms, and read the decision’s final par-
agraph “over and over as [she] cried.”8 It wasn’t just the result of the opin-
ion—the recognition of a fundamental right to marry for gay people—but 
something about its writing that resonated with people as well.9 
Not everyone, though, was so enamored. In his dissent, Justice Antonin 
Scalia called the writing of the majority opinion “straining-to-be-memorable,” 
full of “showy profundities,” and wrote that if he ever joined an opinion with 
such language he would “hide [his] head in a bag.”10 Justice Scalia was not 
alone: other journalists thought the style was excessive11 and legal scholars 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Yasmin Aslam, #LoveWins on the Internet, MSNBC (June 27, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/
msnbc/love-wins-the-internet [https://perma.cc/E2U2-GMM6] (noting that a screenshot of the last 
paragraph went viral and the hashtag #lovewins was trending). 
 6 See Nick Corasaniti, On Social Media, an Outpouring of Support, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-rulings/on-facebook-an-outpouring-of-support [https://
perma.cc/E9S2-469M] (noting that in the hour after the decision was released, 3.8 million people in 
the United States made 10.1 million Facebook likes, posts, comments, and shares about the opinion); 
see also KAREN PETROSKI, FICTION AND THE LANGUAGES OF LAW 1 (2018) (describing the online 
reaction to Obergefell). 
 7 Jordan Weissmann, The Beautiful Closing Paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s Gay Marriage Rul-
ing, SLATE (June 26, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/06/supreme-court-legalizes-gay-
marriage-kennedy-s-decision-ends-beautifully.html [https://perma.cc/ER9W-JH3W]. 
 8 JIA TOLENTINO, TRICK MIRROR: REFLECTIONS ON SELF-DELUSION 284 (2019) (“On the Friday 
that the decision was handed down, I’d planned on staying in, but then the news electrified me with 
such happiness that I went out, and ended up at the club on mushrooms. I remember standing still, 
people dancing all around me, my heart like Funfetti cake, reading the decision’s final paragraph on 
my phone screen over and over as I cried.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Aslam, supra note 5 (noting the decision brought social media users to “virtual tears” as 
they commented on what they saw as a beautiful definition of marriage); Jay Yarrow, This Paragraph 
from the Supreme Court on Marriage Is One of the Most Beautiful Things We’ve Ever Read, BUS. INSID-
ER (June 26, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/supreme-courts-beautiful-description-of-marriage-
2015-6 [https://perma.cc/3MKK-M46M]. 
 10 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628, 2630 & n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to 
say: “The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it de-
mands them in the law. The stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation 
for clear thinking and sober analysis.” Id. at 2630. 
 11 See, e.g., Michael Cobb, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. TIMES, 
(June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-hearts-
club.html [https://perma.cc/HVL3-2ZUM]. In the New York Times Opinion Section, Michael Cobb 
wrote: 
Certainly Justice Kennedy’s sense of marital “dignity” is over the top. But it’s not just 
sentimental rhetoric: It’s a kind of legal “term of heart” that can keep you up at night. 
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who agreed with the result worried that the style of the opinion had eclipsed its 
content because it did not contain a rigorous explanation of the due process or 
equal protection rights upon which it based the decision.12 
Arguments concerning the style of judicial opinions are not new.13 The 
law lives in and through language, and thus many lawyers, judges, and legal 
scholars have traced the evolution of the style of U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
over its history and wondered whether style was merely the “dressing” of an 
opinion or if it had some impact on the meaning of the law and precedent be-
ing written.14 
Fundamental rights cases present a singular stylistic challenge, both be-
cause they require reducing some ineffable right or liberty to language, and 
because they are the cases that the public is most likely to pay attention to.15 
Many judges and scholars have pointed out that the public is a possible audi-
ence of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, and thus opinions should be accessible 
to the layperson.16 Scholars have posited that written opinions legitimize the 
power of unelected judges to write and change laws in a democracy: the need 
                                                                                                                           
The words and the value they communicate are impossible to avoid, and often difficult 
to resist. It’s as if the words of Justice Kennedy and my grandmother, who, on her 
deathbed, begged me to get married, have melded together in my head, declaring my 
life lacking emotions meet law and then throw me into a state of emotional insecurity. 
Id. 
 12 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage—But Based on Dubious Rea-
soning, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/06/26/a-great-decision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/?utm_term=.
2c1cb8ebb62c [https://perma.cc/26JE-QDE2] (agreeing with Obergefell’s result but worrying that it 
was based on questionable reasoning). 
 13 See generally, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES (1931) (discussing stylistic choices in judicial opinions). By “style,” this Note refers to 
anything in an opinion that cannot be paraphrased. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JU-
DICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 143 (2007) (defining style as “whatever in 
the judicial opinion seeks to persuade beyond the paraphrasable content of the decision”); Richard A. 
Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (1995) (defin-
ing style as “what is left out by paraphrase”). 
 14 See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 13, at 6 (arguing that form “make[s] it what it is”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2010 (2002) (arguing 
that analyzing the rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court opinions is central to understanding American con-
stitutional law); James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1995) 
(“The excellence of the opinion is not one of ‘mere style,’ but an excellence of thought, represented 
and enacted in language in such a way as to live in the minds of others.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Supreme Judicial Bullshit, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 141, 155 (2018) (calling 
substantive due process cases a “bullshit magnet”). Fundamental rights cases—also known as substan-
tive due process cases—deal with fundamental liberties such as “protecting family autonomy, procrea-
tion, sexual activity and sexual orientation, medical care decision making, travel, voting, and access to 
the courts” as well as “[f]reedom of speech and religious freedom.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 949 (5th ed. 2017). 
 16 For example, Justice Breyer said in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that he strived to 
write opinions that a high school student would be able to understand. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER 
ON LANGUAGE AND WRITING: SELECTED ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF BRYAN A. GARNER 428 (2009). 
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to write and explain their decision puts a necessary constraint on their power.17 
Yet despite this ideal that judicial opinions—and especially those by the Su-
preme Court—should be publicly accessible, in years past it was infrequent, at 
best, that a layperson ever found herself reading a legal opinion.18 
What is the relationship between Supreme Court opinions and the public? 
The Law and Literature movement, popular in the end of the twentieth century, 
provides one possible answer.19 The movement argues that tools of literary 
theory and criticism can help us understand legal texts, and moreover, that le-
gal texts can be understood as creating community.20 In this Note, I analyze 
Obergefell through the lens of the Law and Literature movement.21 The Law 
and Literature movement is an appropriate framework because Justice Kenne-
dy has stated his own concern with the audience of his opinions, and the Law 
and Literature movement looks at the audience of an opinion to understand its 
stylistic choices.22 I argue that under the Law and Literature framework, Ober-
gefell creates an empathetic relationship with the petitioners and speaks to a 
reader who will respect a decision based on principle rather than on the appli-
cation of a technical legal test.23 
In Part I of this Note, I provide an overview of the evolution of writing 
styles of U.S. Supreme Court opinions and look at the legal and public reac-
tions to Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Obergefell.24 In Part II, I give an overview of the 
Law and Literature movement.25 In Part III, I apply the theories of the Law and 
Literature movement to Obergefell and argue that the opinion speaks to an au-
dience that prioritizes principle over technical legal doctrine.26 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See, e.g., Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
237, 244 (2008) (noting that written opinions serve an important role in democracy). 
 18 See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1463–64 (1995) (noting 
that most Americans do not read judicial opinions and that the only daily American newspaper that 
prints excerpts from judicial opinions is the New York Times); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 
2030 (speculating that more people may read judicial opinions now that they are widely available 
online). 
 19 See generally, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL 
AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990) (using literary theory in legal analysis and analyzing legal texts’ com-
munity-building function). 
 20 See id. at 100. 
 21 See infra Part III. 
 22 See infra Part III. 
 23 See infra Part III. 
 24 See infra Part I. 
 25 See infra Part II. 
 26 See infra Part III. 
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I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WRITING STYLE 
Nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires that judges issue written opin-
ions.27 Nonetheless, our legal system has evolved to be based on often lengthy 
opinions explaining a judge’s reasoning that can be cited in future cases.28 Sec-
tion A of this Part outlines a brief history of how U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
have evolved from the 1790s to the present.29 Section B explores existing aca-
demic analyses of legal opinions.30 Finally, Section C discusses the singular 
style of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinions.31 
A. A Short History of the Evolution of United States  
Supreme Court Written Opinions 
In the early days of the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices only released 
written opinions in a small percentage of cases.32 Scholars have cited Marbury 
v. Madison as the first source to explicitly state the need for written judicial 
opinions.33 Marbury not only holds that it is “emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” but also lays bare a re-
quirement to “expound and interpret” as one does it.34 Chief Justice John Mar-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See GARNER, supra note 16, at 440. 
 28 See infra Part I.A. 
 29 See infra Part I.A. 
 30 See infra Part I.B. 
 31 See infra Part I.C. 
 32 See GARNER, supra note 16, at 440 (noting that in the Court’s early years it issued written 
opinions in only the most consequential cases). For a detailed history of the evolution of U.S. Su-
preme Court writing style, see id. at 439–47. For a detailed account of the evolution of the written 
opinion dating back to its English roots, see POPKIN, supra note 13, at 6–32. See generally DAVID 
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963) (giving a history of legal language). In the early 
English legal system, each judge issued a separate oral opinion from the bench where he explained his 
reasoning to his colleagues. See Patricia M. Wald, “How I Write” Essays, 4 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRIT-
ING 55, 62 (1993) (calling early English oral opinions “stream-of-consciousness” style). The practice 
of regularly issuing written opinions slowly evolved from that custom. POPKIN, supra note 13, at 37. 
French courts, in contrast, issued anonymous and unanimous written opinions that contained short and 
obscure statements of reasons. Id. at 33–34; see also Michael Wells, French and American Judicial 
Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (1994) (contrasting French opinions that are “uninformative 
syllogism[s] of a few hundred words” with American opinions that emphasize “reason and candor”). 
 33 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 13, at 57–58 (contextualizing 
Marbury’s notion of “judicial power” within a discussion of the evolution of American written opin-
ions). 
 34 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and in-
terpret the rule.”); see Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 243–44 (noting that Marbury dictates that 
judges must give reasoned opinions). Others have cited later Court orders and rules as requiring writ-
ten opinions. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 13, at 83. Some scholars cite to a Supreme Court order 
from 1834 that the reporter must “deliver opinions of the Court to the clerk for safekeeping” as an 
implicit requirement that the justices issue written opinions. Id. Ultimately, it became standard for the 
Supreme Court to issue written opinions, though to this day no authority explicitly requires them to. 
Id. at 84. U.S. Supreme Court Rule 41 requires “the Clerk of the Court to ‘release’ opinions immedi-
1940 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1935 
shall also influenced the practice of issuing a single “opinion of the Court,” as 
opposed to the separate opinions favored by English judges.35 He often en-
couraged the other members of the Court to join his majority opinions, eager to 
create the appearance of a strong, unified Court.36 
Since Marbury, the dominant style of Supreme Court decisions has 
evolved and fluctuated.37 In the first half of the nineteenth century, the “grand 
style” or “magisterial” style was popular.38 This style is exemplified in the 
opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, and characterized by grand pronounce-
ments, a lack of explanation, and a view of judges as the “mouthpiece[s] of 
divinity.”39 Chief Justice Marshall is often considered one of the best judicial 
stylists.40 After 1850, a more formal style became popular; it prioritized reason 
and precedent and resulted in opinions that were reliant on jargon and long 
string citations.41 Elements of the formal style live on today, for example, in 
the form of complex three- and four-part tests and standards.42 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s per-
sonal style emerged.43 Justice Holmes was known for memorable, quotable 
language such as “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”44 Although 
some critics have lauded Justice Holmes’s pithy style, others have criticized it 
as reliant on rhetoric at the expense of clear reasoning.45 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the popularity of the formal 
style waned and was replaced by opinions heavily influenced by the Legal Re-
                                                                                                                           
ately after their announcement and to cause them to be issued in ‘slip form,’” which scholars have 
noted may implicitly require written opinions. Id. 
 35 GARNER, supra note 16, at 441; POPKIN, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
 36 GARNER, supra note 16, at 441; POPKIN, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
 37 See GARNER, supra note 16, at 439–45 (summarizing the evolution of Supreme Court style); 
POPKIN, supra note 13, at 86–178 (same). 
 38 CARDOZO, supra note 13, at 10; GARNER, supra note 16, at 439. 
 39 CARDOZO, supra note 13, at 10–16 (describing the “magisterial or imperative” and “grand” 
style as one that forgoes explanation in favor of grand pronouncements and that makes the reader “feel 
the mystery and the awe of inspired revelation”); GARNER, supra note 16, at 439 (describing the 
“grand style”). 
 40 GARNER, supra note 16, at 445. 
 41 Id. at 439. 
 42 Id.; see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without 
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98–99 (1993) (objecting to “three or four ‘prong’ tests eve-
rywhere and for everything”). 
 43 GARNER, supra note 16, at 439. Judge Posner cited Holmes’s opinions as examples of “im-
pure” style, because they are “personal and exploratory.” POPKIN, supra note 13, at 152. Justice 
Cardozo, too, characterized Holmes’s style as “personal” and wrote that it “make[s] us partners in the 
deliberative process.” Id. 
 44 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); see, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 13, at 155 (characterizing 
Holmes’s style as “pithy aphorisms to summarize legal conclusions”). 
 45 GARNER, supra note 16, at 445. The literary critic Edmund Wilson called Holmes’s style “per-
fect.” Id. In contrast, Judge Posner thought that Holmes’s rhetorical devices merely eclipsed the lack 
of rigorous legal reasoning. Id. 
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alism movement.46 The Legal Realists rejected the formalist reliance on ab-
stract principles, and instead acknowledged the impact of political, social, and 
economic pressures on judges’ decisions.47 Critics have cited the Legal Realist 
movement as one factor influencing the increasing length of legal opinions and 
the increasing number of separate opinions.48 
Indeed, over the last century, opinions have become more lengthy, and 
separate opinions have become more prevalent.49 In addition to the advent of 
Legal Realism, critics have attributed the shift toward lengthier opinions to the 
increase of cases about controversial issues and the fact that opinions are in-
creasingly written by inexperienced law clerks who tend to overwrite.50 Schol-
ars attribute the growing prevalence of separate opinions to the appearance of 
increasingly complicated cases, an ideologically divided Court, the rise in con-
stitutional cases, and the modern style, which requires judges to address and 
explain every possible issue.51 
                                                                                                                           
 46 POPKIN, supra note 13, at 116–17 (describing the shift to Legal Realism and summarizing the 
Legal Realist movement). 
 47 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10, 19–20 (1921) 
(noting that a judicial decision should be a combination of precedent, consistency, custom, social 
welfare, and common morality); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN 
BAG 607, 612 (1907) (rejecting “legal monks” who lived in an “atmosphere of pure law” in favor of 
examining how law relates to the real world); see also POPKIN, supra note 13, at 116–18 (summariz-
ing legal realism). 
 48 POPKIN, supra note 13, at 116 (noting that Legal Realism encouraged separate opinions be-
cause its emphasis on political, social, and economic influences accounted for the idea that judges 
could disagree about the law because it was not based on unchanging legal principle). 
 49 See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 2021 (“My sense of opinions today is that they are much 
longer than they used to be, far more extensively footnoted, and generally less well-written than those 
from earlier times.”); Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 254 (noting that between 1960 and 1980 the 
average word count of opinions from federal courts of appeals increased from 2,863 to 4,020); Abner 
J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1988) (noting that, in 1920, the 
average U.S. Supreme Court opinion was seven pages, and in 1989 it had grown to twenty pages); see 
also POPKIN, supra note 13, at 114 (noting there has been a considerable increase in separate opinions 
in the modern Court). Before 1940, only about 20% of Supreme Court cases resulted in separate opin-
ions, but now about 60–80% of cases result in separate opinions. POPKIN, supra note 13, at 114. 
 50 See GARNER, supra note 16, at 444 (noting commentators have attributed lengthening of opin-
ions to the increase of “complex and ideologically heated issues”); Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 
255 (quoting one judge’s criticism that law clerks tend to overwrite opinions). Many critics have not-
ed the impact of law clerks on the style of judicial opinions, blaming the law clerks’ indoctrination to 
so-called “law review style.” See, e.g., GARNER, supra note 16, at 443 (noting that because clerks are 
often former law review editors, clerk-written opinions often contain the most negative traits of law 
review style, namely, they are “diffuse, loaded with footnotes, impersonal in tone, and unimaginative 
in presentation”); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 13 (1988) (noting that the literary 
style of opinions is dwindling because they are commonly written by law clerks who are generally not 
“capable of literary expression”); Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 304–07 (noting that modern law 
clerks generally write the first draft of an opinion and discussing the ethical implications); Mikva, 
supra note 49, at 1366 (blaming the lengthening of opinions on law clerks among other factors). 
 51 GARNER, supra note 16, at 433, 442, 444 (explaining possible reasons for an influx of concur-
rences and dissents and noting that modern judges value writing that explicitly demonstrates each step 
in its analysis). 
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In the second half of the twentieth century, a new rhetorical movement 
that prioritized “plain language” became popular.52 The movement advocated 
for a departure from legalese, and instead promoted the idea that legal docu-
ments should be written in language that was accessible not only to a lawyer, 
but also to any ordinary person of average intelligence.53 Legalese does not 
refer to terms of art such as “habeas corpus” or “indemnity” that have precise 
meanings that cannot be paraphrased.54 Rather, legalese refers to unnecessary 
jargon such as “hereinbefore stated,” “instant case,” or “such claims” that has 
no precise referent, but rather serves only to make the document sound legal.55 
Although the Plain Language Movement applied to all types of legal writing, it 
focused predominately on documents that ordinary people would most often 
need to interpret, such as statutes, contracts, and jury instructions.56 
B. Academic Studies of Legal Opinions 
The style of judicial opinions has increasingly become an area of academ-
ic study.57 In 1995, the University of Chicago Law Review published a sympo-
sium issue entitled Judicial Opinion Writing.58 In the introduction, legal schol-
ar James Boyd White asked whether it matters how judicial opinions are writ-
ten, and if so, why.59 The symposium issue also contained Judge Richard Pos-
ner’s definitions of “pure” and “impure” style, which have since been adopted 
by other critics.60 Posner defined style as that which cannot be paraphrased.61 
He noted that “pure” style is characterized by serious and polished rhetoric, as 
well as the use of technical legal terms without explaining them in layperson’s 
terms.62 In contrast, the less common “impure” style is addressed to “a hypo-
                                                                                                                           
 52 See generally MELLINKOFF, supra note 32 (arguing there is no reason for legal language to 
differ from ordinary language); RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (5th ed. 2005) 
(noting the legal writing reforms of the late twentieth century and arguing for use of plain English). 
 53 See, e.g., WYDICK, supra note 52, at 2–3 (noting issues that arise when jurors do not under-
stand jury instructions, or parties to a contract do not understand the terms). 
 54 GARNER, supra note 16, at 308. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 211– 40 (1999) (analyzing plain language in 
statutes, consumer documents, and jury instructions). 
 57 See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1974) (collecting 
wisdom of great jurists on opinion writing); POPKIN, supra note 13 (discussing the evolution of judi-
cial opinion style); Symposium, Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995) (discussing 
style of judicial opinions). 
 58 Symposium, supra note 57. 
 59 White, supra note 14, at 1363. 
 60 Posner, supra note 13, at 1421–32. See generally, e.g., Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 250–52 
(discussing the ethical questions posed by Posner’s “pure” and “impure” style). 
 61 Posner, supra note 13, at 1422 (defining “style”). 
 62 Id. at 1429. 
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thetical audience of laypersons,” and replaces legal jargon with a candid, con-
versational tone.63 
Critics have also noted the disparate audiences for judicial opinions.64 
Frequently cited audiences for Supreme Court opinions are lower courts, 
members of the bar, the litigants from the case, professional critics, and the 
public.65 Many scholars have cited the democratic process as a justification for 
the need for written opinions: the need to explain the reasoning behind one’s 
decision making lends credibility to the power of an unelected judiciary.66 Fur-
ther, scholars have noted that the idea that an opinion should be readable by a 
layperson is uniquely American.67 In years past, however, the idea of the pub-
lic as an audience for opinions was largely hypothetical.68 Before the age of 
the internet, it was relatively rare that a member of the public would come 
across the text of a judicial opinion.69 Critics have noted, however, that the 
advent of the internet has increased the accessibility of written opinions, and 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Id. at 1430; see also GARNER, supra note 16, at 429 (noting that impure style has been called 
the “mystery-novel approach”). 
 64 See, e.g., Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 246–48 (discussing possible audiences). 
 65 GARNER, supra note 16, at 428 (describing possible audiences); Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 
2022–23 (same); Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 246 (same). 
 66 See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 13, at 83 (noting that written opinions give public accountability 
for judges’ decisions); Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 244 (quoting George R. Smith, A Primer of 
Opinion Writing, for Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 200–01 (1967)) (“Above all else to 
expose the court’s decision to public scrutiny, to nail it up on the wall for all to see. In no other way 
can it be known whether the law needs revision, whether the court is doing its job, whether a particu-
lar judge is competent.”).  
 67 See, e.g., Lebovits et al., supra note 17, at 247 (contrasting U.S. judicial style of accountability 
to the public with the English belief that the judiciary is accountable primarily to the litigants); see 
also Mikva, supra note 49, at 1365 (“[T]he provisions for written opinions seem also to have reflected 
popular antagonism toward judges—the public’s desire to enforce intellectual honesty on the bench 
and to ensure that judges did their job.”) Erwin Chemerinsky describes prominent judges and profes-
sors who have based their theories of constitutional interpretation on the Court’s need to safeguard its 
legitimacy with the public. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 2028. Chemerinsky goes on to note, how-
ever, that this concern is largely baseless: the modern Court’s credibility has been consistently high, 
and even the controversy surrounding Bush v. Gore showed that the Court’s credibility is not fragile. 
Id. at 2029–30. Chemerinsky concludes that, though the public’s support of the Court is not fragile, 
the public is nonetheless an important audience and important rulings on controversial issues should 
be written such that the public will understand them. Id. at 2030. But see Schauer, supra note 18, at 
1462–63 (arguing the opinions serve a function similar to written statutes or regulations, and need not 
be accessible to the public). 
 68 Mikva, supra note 49, at 1365 (noting that until the late twentieth century, it was unlikely that 
members of the public ever read judicial opinions). Judge Posner notes that the primary “implied audi-
ence” of the “impure” style includes laypeople who can “‘see through’ the artifice of judicial pretension.” 
Posner, supra note 13, at 1431. Judge Posner goes on to describe Justice Holmes’s stance that he wrote 
for the “one in a thousand.” Id. Garner describes the tendency to write to an “ordinary reader”—that is a 
person of average intelligence—“as a useful fiction.” GARNER, supra note 16, at 428. 
 69 Schauer, supra note 18, at 1463–64 (noting that, at the time, the only daily American newspa-
per that printed excerpts from judicial opinions was the New York Times). 
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thus has perhaps increased numbers of laypeople who read opinions, or at least 
excerpts from them.70 
In recent years, scholars have begun to study public understandings of ju-
dicial opinions—not just in theory, but in practice—and have asked whether 
written court decisions affect public opinion.71 In 2011, two researchers con-
ducted a study specifically about how the style of a decision affected public 
opinion of the issue.72 In that study, non-lawyers were presented with judicial 
opinions containing different modes of argument, and were asked to assess the 
legitimacy of the opinion.73 The study found that participants tended to give 
high scores to opinions where they agreed with the outcome, and low scores to 
those with which they disagreed.74 In other words, they found that the opin-
ion’s style and mode of reasoning did not have a strong impact on the public’s 
agreement or disagreement with the decision.75 
Another popular method of analysis of judicial style in recent years has 
been quantitative analysis.76 In the field of literary analysis, scholars have long 
used computer programming to analyze the prevalence of certain words or 
phrases in novels.77 In recent years, the legal community has sought to apply 
this method to judicial texts, using coding to identify certain linguistic devic-
es.78 The methodology has even appeared in popular media: in 2014, Slate 
published an article that used a quantitative analysis to compare the vocabulary 
of various Supreme Court justices to that of famous rappers.79 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 2030 (speculating that the internet will increase the 
number of people who actually read Supreme Court opinions); see also Lebovits et al., supra note 17, 
at 246–47 (noting that keeping the public in mind as an audience is especially important now that 
opinions are widely accessible via the internet). 
 71 See, e.g., VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2003) 
(studying media reporting and public opinion about four Supreme Court cases in the region where 
each controversy took place); Nicholas Scurich, Styles of Argumentation in Judicial Opinions (Legiti-
mating Judicial Decisions), 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 205, 205 (2018) (“The study of public reac-
tions to judicial opinions is important and in its infancy.”). 
 72 See generally Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 
J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 709 (2011). 
 73 Simon & Scurich, supra note 72, at 712–13. The study did not examine writing styles specifi-
cally, but rather modes of reasoning: it compared opinions that avowed unequivocal endorsement for a 
certain side with ones that are honest about the difficulty and indeterminacy of the legal question. See 
id. at 710. Namely, it compared four disparate modes of reasoning: (1) no reasoning supporting the 
decision; (2) a single reason supporting the decision; (3) multiple reasons supporting the decision; and 
(4) multiple reasons that supported both sides of the issue. Id. at 712. 
 74 Id. at 709. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Keith Carlson et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Writing Style on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1472–73 (2016) (summarizing scholarship in the area). 
 77 Id. at 1471 n.59 (giving an overview of the history of quantitative literary analysis). 
 78 Id. at 1472–73. 
 79 See Adam Chilton et al., Rappers v. SCOTUS: Who Uses a Bigger Vocabulary, Jay Z or Scal-
ia?, SLATE (June 12, 2014), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/06/supreme-court-and-rappers-
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With the increased scrutiny on writing style has come strong opinions 
about the styles of contemporary Supreme Court justices.80 Justices John Rob-
erts, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer are commonly 
considered the most effective writers.81 Justice Scalia is known for his clear 
language and biting wit.82 Recently, Justice Gorsuch has made waves by using 
contractions in majority opinions.83 Though Justice Anthony Kennedy’s writ-
ing style is the topic of frequent debate, he is generally not considered a 
great—or even a good—writer.84 
C. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Writing Style 
Justice Kennedy is known not only for his place as the swing vote, but al-
so for a grandiose writing style that is sometimes sparse in traditional legal 
analysis.85 His rhetoric is often criticized—and quite harshly.86 The word “phi-
                                                                                                                           
who-uses-a-bigger-vocabulary-jay-z-or-scalia.html [https://perma.cc/MCR7-SQ5L] (finding, among 
other things, that Justice Scalia had a more complex vocabulary than Shakespeare). 
 80 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, #GorsuchStyle Garners a Gusher of Groans. But Is His Writing Really 
That Bad?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/justice-neil-
gorsuch-writing-style.html [https://perma.cc/4YJ3-5LKK] (noting that the Twitter hashtag #Gor-
suchStyle is used to mock Justice Gorsuch’s proclivity to make grand pronouncements). 
 81 GARNER, supra note 16, at 434. 
 82 Ann Gerhart & Philip Rucker, Kagan Has Many Achievements, but Her World Has Been Rela-
tively Narrow, WASH. POST (June 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/06/09/AR2010060906240.html [https://perma.cc/9YVT-MGQN]. Justice Kagan once called 
Justice Scalia “the most colorful, most intellectually playful, the most provocative member of the 
[C]ourt, and he is indubitably its greatest writer.” Id. 
 83 Liptak, supra note 80. Bryan Garner, in his first book with Justice Scalia, has also advocated 
for the use of contractions in legal writing: “You might well have heard that contractions don’t belong 
in legal writing. The view seems to be that they aren’t professional. But that’s just a shibboleth. In 
fact, the decision whether to use a contraction often boils down to this: do I want to sound natural, or 
do I want to sound stuffy?” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART 
OF PERSUADING JUDGES 115 (2008). 
 84 See, e.g., Ed Whelan, Justice Kennedy and Ernest Hemingway, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 9, 2014), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/justice-kennedy-and-ernest-hemingway-ed-whelan 
[https://perma.cc/VS8H-TDSW] (“Anthony Kennedy is a painfully bad writer. I’d think that’s a prop-
osition that would earn a consensus across the ideological spectrum.”). 
 85 See HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON 
LIBERTY 4, 181 (2009) (noting that Justice Kennedy was known as the swing vote and that he was 
known for “elitist” and “pompous” writing); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 66 (2007) (“Kennedy had a weakness for high-flown, sometimes 
rather meaningless rhetoric . . . .”). 
 86 See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(refusing to join the majority opinion because of Justice Kennedy’s “undisciplined dicta”); Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has descend-
ed from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms 
of the fortune cookie.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2011), https://
newrepublic.com/article/92773/elena-kagan-writings [https://perma.cc/9TKA-YSN9] (“[Justice Ken-
nedy is] arguably, the most painful writer. His prose alternates between bureaucratic and grandiose, 
resulting in sentences that manage to be pompous and clueless at the same time.”); see also Michael 
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losopher king” is thrown around pejoratively.87 His flowery language has 
sometimes been tied to a concern with audience and his explicit goal of using 
his opinions to “teach” the Constitution to the public.88 Justice Kennedy has 
also spoken publicly about his pet peeves in writing, and among those who 
care about this kind of thing, he is known for a hatred of adverbs.89 His signa-
ture writing style is most evident in his fundamental rights opinions.90 This 
Section will outline the existing analysis and criticism of Justice Kennedy’s 
writing style in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
and Obergefell v. Hodges.91 
A frequently cited example of Justice Kennedy’s grandiose language is 
the opinion in Casey.92 Casey, decided in 1992, reaffirmed the central holding 
of Roe v. Wade that women have a fundamental right to seek an abortion.93 
Though the majority opinion was jointly authored by Justices O’Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter, critics have attributed both the first line and the “mystery of 
human life” passage to Justice Kennedy.94 The opinion begins: “Liberty finds 
                                                                                                                           
C. Dorf, Jeffrey Rosen on Justice Kennedy, DORF ON LAW (June 16, 2007, 8:45 AM), http://www.
dorfonlaw.org/2007/06/jeffrey-rosen-on-justice-kennedy.html [https://perma.cc/5ZBF-NPUB] (noting 
that Rosen’s criticism is “so over the top that one wonders whether Rosen believes that Kennedy per-
sonally harmed Rosen in some way”). 
 87 Justice Kennedy’s Writing Style at 00:09:09, C-SPAN (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/
video/?452172-3/justice-kennedys-writing-style [https://perma.cc/LD7E-PW57]. 
 88 See infra notes 117–121 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s concern with audience). 
 89 See Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 92–93 (2010) (stating that 
Justice Kennedy thinks adverbs are a “cop-out”); see, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Why Adverbs, Maligned 
by Many, Flourish in the American Legal System, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/why-adverbs-maligned-by-many-flourish-in-the-american-legal-system-1412735402 [https://
perma.cc/YQ6R-SHGB] (noting Justice Kennedy’s dislike of adverbs); Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs 
Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2011), https://nytimes.com/2011/05/21/us/
politics/21court.html [https://perma.cc/G6WL-WSV4] (same); Whelan, supra note 84 (noting that 
Justice Kennedy instructs his clerks to avoid using adverbs). 
 90 See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 85, at 56 (noting Justice Kennedy’s writing style was “at his airy 
best (or worst) in Casey”); see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–
47 (1992) (affirming that abortion is a fundamental right). 
 91 See infra notes 92–149 and accompanying text. 
 92 505 U.S. at 833; KNOWLES, supra note 85, at 182 (noting that Part II of Casey consisted of the 
type of “grand phrases and philosophical musings . . . that drive[] conservatives bananas”). 
 93 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973). 
 94 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; see KNOWLES, supra note 85, at 181 (Justice Kennedy authored the 
first sentence of the joint opinion in Casey); Trent L. Pepper, The “Mystery of Life” in the Lower 
Courts: The Influence of the Mystery Passage on American Jurisprudence, 51 HOW. L.J. 335, 338 
n.21 (2008) (noting Justice Kennedy supposedly wrote the mystery passage). Before analyzing the 
writing style of Justice Kennedy’s opinions, it is also worth noting the role of law clerks in crafting 
Supreme Court opinions. See supra note 50 (citing sources that discuss the impact of law clerks on 
judicial style). Critics have pointed out, however, that despite the substantial latitude he gives to his 
law clerks, Justice Kennedy’s signature writing style is a product of him, not his clerks. See 
KNOWLES, supra note 85, at 14–15 (comparing the writing style of Justice Kennedy’s opinions to that 
of his speeches and noting that Justice Kennedy is known to give freedom to his clerks when draft-
ing). Further, James Boyd White posited that the Casey opinion was written predominately by the 
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no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”95 Critics have tried to dissect what ex-
actly this line is supposed to mean.96 Justice Scalia shared this skepticism, and 
mocked the phrase in his dissent, stating, “[r]eason finds no refuge in this ju-
risprudence of confusion.”97 
An even more paradigmatic example of Justice Kennedy’s rhetorical style 
from Casey is the “mystery passage.”98 It reads: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of ex-
istence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.99 
The passage was later cited in Washington v. Glucksberg100 and Lawrence v. 
Texas,101 as well as in various lower court cases.102 Lawrence, decided in 2003 
and authored by Justice Kennedy, held that a Texas statute criminalizing sod-
omy was unconstitutional.103 In his biting dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia 
called the mystery passage the “famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage” and 
contended that it “casts some doubt upon either the totality of our jurispru-
dence or else (presumably the right answer) nothing at all.”104 Critics, too, had 
a field day with the passage, calling it, for example, “a bad freshman philoso-
phy paper”105 and an “embarrassing muddle.”106 
Not only did members of the legal community criticize the passage’s 
flowery rhetoric, but they also attempted to figure out what the passage actual-
                                                                                                                           
justices themselves, and not by their clerks. JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AU-
THORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS 168 n.19 (1994) (arguing Casey was likely written by 
the justices themselves due to the importance of the issue, the difficulty of the negotiations, and the 
fact that it is written in easily distinguishable voices). 
 95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 96 See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 15, at 164–65 (wondering what exactly the “jurisprudence of 
doubt” refers to, and arguing both that it would have been more clear to note that the jurisprudence 
surrounding reproductive rights was in doubt and further, that actually liberty does find some refuge 
in the jurisprudence of doubt). 
 97 Casey, 505 U.S. at 984, 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98 Justice Kennedy’s Writing Style, supra note 87, at 00:00:56 (noting the “mystery of human 
life” passage is Justice Kennedy’s most famous, or infamous, passage). 
 99 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 100 521 U.S. 702, 726–27 (1997). 
 101 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 102 See Pepper, supra note 94, at 343 nn.44–46 (citing lower court cases that quote the mystery 
passage). 
 103 539 U.S. at 558. 
 104 Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105 John H. Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). 
 106 Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-a-Delic Supreme Court: “Anal Sex,” “Mystery,” “Destiny,” and 
the “Transcendent” in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 365, 379 (2004); see also 
Pepper, supra note 94, at 335 (quoting Mohr, supra, at 379). 
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ly meant.107 For example, the plain words of the passage seem to state that 
what is at stake is the right to define a concept, not the right to actually do any-
thing based on that concept.108 But, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in 
Lawrence, a case that protected only people’s right to define concepts would 
be relatively meaningless, while a case that protected any actions based on a 
self-defined concept would be incomprehensibly broad.109 
Despite the seemingly singular ire the “mystery passage” has inspired, 
Justice Kennedy’s baroque style may not be so unusual among Supreme Court 
opinions.110 One scholar compared the mystery passage to Justice Brandeis’s 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States where he also sought to explain just what 
the word “liberty” signified.111 Others have compared Kennedy’s writing style 
to that of Justice David Souter and Judge Posner.112 
Indeed, the mystery passage exemplifies not only Justice Kennedy’s 
magniloquent language, but also a judicial philosophy that some argue under-
relies on traditional legal doctrine.113 Professor Michael Dorf, a former Kenne-
dy clerk, posited that Justice Kennedy’s opinions are characterized both by 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Kolber, supra note 15, at 142–43 (analyzing the mystery passage and calling it an example of 
“judicial bullshit”). 
 108 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see Kolber, supra note 15, at 143 (“If Casey were merely about rights 
to define concepts, it would be of greater interest to metaphysicians than actual physicians.”). 
 109 See 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have never heard of a law that attempted to 
restrict one’s ‘right to define’ certain concepts; and if the passage calls into question the government’s 
power to regulate actions based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the passage that 
ate the rule of law.”). 
 110 See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 
75, 119 (comparing the mystery passage to a passage by Brandeis). 
 111 See id. (noting that the lineage of the mystery passage is rarely recognized and comparing the 
passage to Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States). In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis wrote: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit 
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of 
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead and calling 
it “[p]erhaps the most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty underlying these aspects of 
the Constitution”); WHITE, supra note 94, at 172 (comparing the mystery passage to Harlan’s opinion 
in Poe in which Harlan refused to reduce due process to a code). 
 112 See Justice Kennedy’s Writing Style, supra note 87, at 00:32:50–00:34:10, 01:00:15–01:00:45 
(positing that Justice Kennedy hid behind doctrine in a way similar to Judge Posner and wondering 
why Justice Souter never received as much criticism for using baroque language as Justice Kennedy 
did); see also PETROSKI, supra note 6, at 2 (arguing that Obergefell’s rhetoric was not unique among 
judicial style). 
 113 See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE, at ix (2009) (noting 
scholars frequently criticize Justice Kennedy’s opinions for being under-theorized); KNOWLES, supra 
note 85, at 2 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinions are considered deficient in their use of judicial 
tests frequently used by the Court). 
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their grandiose rhetoric and their deviation from standard doctrine.114 Others 
have criticized Justice Kennedy for deciding more from his gut or his heart 
than from a rigorous application of precedent.115 Not everyone, though, agrees 
with this criticism, and some critics have argued that, despite his reputation for 
being unpredictable, Justice Kennedy’s opinions showcase a consistent and 
coherent judicial philosophy based on liberty, dignity, and the limits of gov-
ernment power.116 
In addition to his soaring language and departure from traditional legal 
doctrine, another signature trait of Justice Kennedy’s opinions—at least in cas-
es of public importance—is a concern with audience.117 In his interview with 
legal writing expert and plain language advocate Bryan Garner, Justice Kenne-
dy gave a hint of how he thinks about the audience of his opinions: 
[G]ood writing—great writing—is one which captures the imagina-
tion and allows you, the reader, to become part of the text. Now, I 
think it would be presumptuous and arrogant to say that this is what 
we can do or should do with judicial opinions . . . . And if it’s a case 
of public importance, you have a different and much more difficult 
objective. You must command allegiance to your opinion. You must 
command allegiance to the judgment of the Court. This is the com-
mon-law tradition. It is quite different in this respect than the Conti-
nental tradition. If you read a judgment of a European court in the 
civil-law tradition in a civil-law jurisdiction, it would strike you as 
being rather uninteresting. It is digested. It is almost like a headnote 
in West Digest, whereas if you look at an opinion of the Supreme 
Court, say in a case of public importance, it has a rhetorical, almost 
an emotive quality about it designed to instill this allegiance of 
which I speak.118 
Not only has Justice Kennedy stated that in cases of public importance he be-
lieves emotional rhetoric can be important in eliciting public allegiance to a 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Michael C. Dorf, Justice Kennedy’s Writing Style and First Amendment Jurisprudence, DORF ON 
LAW (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:36 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/10/justice-kennedy-and-first-amendment-
and.html [https://perma.cc/Q6AF-N4SX]. 
 115 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: On the Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC 
(June 16, 2007), https://newrepublic.com/article/60925/supreme-leader-the-arrogance-anthony-kennedy 
[https://perma.cc/BG7C-XMFX] (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s opinions for being based more on his 
instincts about fairness than on strict legal analysis). 
 116 See, e.g., COLUCCI, supra note 113, at 7 (challenging the popular view of Justice Kennedy as 
inconsistent, and arguing that his opinions display a coherent approach to constitutional interpretation 
based on liberty, dignity, and limited government power); KNOWLES, supra note 85, at 2 (challenging 
the conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s opinions do not demonstrate well-defined legal doctrine). 
 117 See Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 89, at 80, 84–85 (describing how Justice Kenne-
dy thinks about audience). 
 118 Id.  
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court’s decision, but he has also spoken about the justices’ duty to “teach” the 
Constitution to the public.119 Critics, too, have recognized Justice Kennedy’s 
concern with an audience that includes not only the parties and members of the 
bar, but members of the public as well.120 Professor Dorf noted Justice Kenne-
dy’s goal of communicating with those outside of the legal community, but 
wondered whether his ornate language actually achieved this effect, or whether 
plain language would have better communicated to the public.121 
Critics have noted that each of Justice Kennedy’s signature rhetorical 
quirks is apparent in his 2015 opinion in Obergefell: its doctrinal analysis is 
thin at best, it uses grand language, and it seems to be written with a greater 
public audience in mind.122 Many critics—even those who agreed with Ober-
gefell’s result—have criticized the opinion’s doctrinal analysis, or lack there-
of.123 Obergefell’s holding is based on both due process and equal protection 
grounds.124 Critics worry that the due process analysis is incoherent in its ap-
plication of the test from Glucksberg, which identifies fundamental rights as 
based on their history and tradition.125 Critics argue the equal protection analy-
sis is similarly obscure, and criticize the opinion for not stating explicitly that 
sexual orientation is a suspect class subject to a higher level of scrutiny, and 
indeed, for not stating what level of scrutiny it applies at all.126 Other academ-
                                                                                                                           
 119 Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2008) (quoting Justice Kennedy); Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 
89, at 80, 84–85. In 2008, Justice Kennedy responded to a student’s question by saying: “The Consti-
tution is the enduring and common link that we have as Americans and it is something that we must 
teach to and transmit to the next generation. Judges are teachers. By our opinions, we teach.” Guinier, 
supra, at 7; see also Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1022 (2016) 
(citing Guinier, supra, at 7). 
 120 Justice Kennedy’s Writing Style, supra note 87, at 00:05:17 (noting that in cases of public 
importance, Justice Kennedy was writing to “the people,” meaning readers of the New York Times). 
 121 See Dorf, supra note 114 (noting Justice Kennedy’s inclination towards highbrow rhetoric, 
and wondering whether he would have better connected with the public by valuing plain language). 
 122 135 S. Ct. at 2585. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have the 
fundamental right to marry. Id. The decision came after intense political debate over marriage equali-
ty. See Schacter, supra note 119, at 1013–15 (summarizing the political context of Obergefell). In 
2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had become the first state to hold there was a state 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Id. at 1013; see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003). Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge 
cited Casey in its definition of individual liberty. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 (citing Casey). 
 123 Professor Laurence Tribe noted that in certain circles, it has been in vogue to speak of the 
Obergefell opinion with a “knowing condescension.” Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its 
Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 16 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
11/vol129_Tribe.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TSL-CP2E]; see also Somin, supra note 12 (agreeing with 
Obergefell’s result but worrying that it was based on questionable reasoning). 
 124 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
 125 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 12 (noting the confusion of Justice Kennedy’s due process analy-
sis); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (describing substantive due process framework). 
 126 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 12 (noting the confusion of Justice Kennedy’s equal protection 
analysis). Laws that discriminate based on race or national origin are generally subject to strict scruti-
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ics, though, have disagreed, arguing that Obergefell does important doctrinal 
work by exhibiting a new approach to fundamental rights cases.127 
Critics have waged similar criticisms at Obergefell as they did at the 
“mystery passage” in Casey.128 Justice Scalia famously analogized the majori-
ty opinion in Obergefell to “the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie,” and 
wrote that the majority opinion was “couched in a style that is as pretentious as 
its content is egotistic.”129 Even the less scathing Chief Justice John Roberts 
accused the majority opinion of hiding behind a “shiny rhetorical gloss.”130 
In contrast to the legal community, though, much of the public was enam-
ored with Obergefell’s style.131 Journalists called it “one of the most beautiful 
passages you’ll likely read in a court case”132 and “one of the most beautiful 
things we’ve ever read.”133 Much of the focus was on the final paragraph, 
which read: 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the high-
est ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming 
a marital union, two people become something greater than once 
they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, 
marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would 
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea 
of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply 
                                                                                                                           
ny. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 727. Those laws will only be upheld if the government can 
show that they are “necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.” Id. Laws that discriminate based on 
gender are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning they will be upheld if they are “sub-
stantially related to an important government purpose.” Id. Other forms of discrimination will be sub-
ject to rational basis review. Id. at 728. Those laws will be upheld if they are “rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.” Id. 
 127 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 123, at 17 (arguing Obergefell’s combination of Due Process and 
Equal Protection into a doctrine of “equal dignity” is an achievement); Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme 
Court, 2014 Term—Comment: A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
147, 169 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell offers a new approach to fundamental rights, replacing the 
Glucksberg due process analysis with a framework based on Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe). 
 128 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 119, at 1017 (noting that Obergefell contains grandiose lan-
guage). 
 129 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630, 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court of the 
United States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story 
to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.”). Justice Scalia went on to ridicule how incoherent 
the opinion’s “showy profundities” were. Id. at 2630. In response to a line in the majority opinion 
stating “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other 
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality,” Justice Scalia wrote, “Really? Who ever 
thought that intimacy and spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one 
would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hip-
pie.” Id. 
 130 Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 131 See infra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 132 Weissmann, supra note 7. 
 133 Yarrow, supra note 9. 
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that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not 
to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civiliza-
tion’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of 
the law. The Constitution grants them that right.134 
The final paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion described marriage 
in grandiose terms as the “highest ideal[] of love,” that had the power to turn 
two people into “something greater than once they were.”135 The public shared 
the passage on Facebook and read it at marriage ceremonies.136 
Despite the reverence with which the liberal media and much of the pub-
lic regarded Obergefell’s style, there was one aspect of the opinion they could 
not quite get behind: are non-married people, of whatever sexual orientation, 
really “condemned to live in loneliness?”137 Not only did the otherwise perfect 
last paragraph imply that the unmarried are necessarily lonely, but the middle 
of the opinion contained the following line: “Marriage responds to the univer-
sal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there.”138 Critics 
bristled: yes, they wanted same-sex couples afforded the right to marry, but 
they did not want single people taken down in the process.139 
Finally, scholars have analyzed Obergefell’s relationship to its audi-
ence.140 Unlike in years past when Supreme Court opinions were largely inac-
cessible to members of the public, Obergefell was released in the age of social 
media, and within hours, passages of the opinion were liked, shared, tweeted, 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Schachar, supra note 3 (noting Obergefell’s use in wedding ceremonies); see Corasaniti, supra 
note 6 (noting Obergefell’s likes and shares on social media). Obergefell was not the first court case to 
find its way into marriage ceremonies. See Sasha Issenberg, With These Words, N.Y. MAG. (July 27, 
2012), http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/goodridge-same-sex-marriage-2012-8 [https://perma.cc/
4JRZ-U49N]. After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that there was a state 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, many couples, both straight and gay, began reading passag-
es from Goodridge at their wedding ceremonies. Id. Passages from Loving v. Virginia, the case declar-
ing that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional, have also been a favorite for wedding 
ceremonies. See, e.g., Catherine Clark, Stirring Quotes from Loving v. Virginia to Include in Your 
Ceremony, OFFBEAT BRIDE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://offbeatbride.com/quotes-from-loving-v-virginia/ 
[https://perma.cc/26C2-ZBMR] (suggesting passages from Loving for a wedding ceremony). 
 137 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608; see also supra notes 7–9 (citing examples of journalists’ 
love for Obergefell). 
 138 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 139 See, e.g., Lisa Bonos, Hey, Justice Kennedy: You Don’t Need to Shame Singles to Uphold 
Marriage, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2015/06/
26/hey-justice-kennedy-you-dont-need-to-shame-singles-to-uphold-marriage/?utm_term=.4006857
68e10 [https://perma.cc/5DDX-VX4L] (arguing Obergefell engages in single-shaming). See generally 
Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) (arguing legal scholarship 
has largely ignored the way nonmarital relationships are regulated). 
 140 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 119, at 1012 (analyzing Obergefell’s relationship to both the 
legal community and the public at large). 
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and instagrammed by some ten million people.141 The idea that a layperson 
would read a Supreme Court opinion was no longer largely hypothetical; it was 
a reality.142 Critics have analyzed how the justices’ awareness of a public audi-
ence might have affected the way they crafted the majority and dissenting 
opinions.143 One critic noted that Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on style over 
substance was likely an attempt to speak to the non-legal public.144 The critic 
also noted how some passages of the majority opinion seem to be addressed to 
readers who would not have been as pleased with the outcome, for example, 
the line: “Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclu-
sion based on decent and honorable . . . premises.”145 Not only did Justice 
Kennedy use grandiose language to energize and inspire those who would have 
agreed with the result, but he also seemed to address portions of the decision to 
those who did not agree, assuring them their beliefs were nonetheless based on 
a “decent and honorable” foundation.146 
The majority opinion was not alone, however, in apparently addressing 
the general public.147 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion contained a 
passage that critics have noted is explicitly addressed to a portion of the public: 
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orienta-
tion—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means cele-
brate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. 
Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 1029 (noting that in the first hour after the opinion was released, 3.8 million people 
used Facebook to communicate about it, and between 9:30 am and 5:30 pm that day, there were over 
ten million Tweets about it); Schauer, supra note 18, at 1463–64 (noting that before the internet, the 
only daily newspaper that ever published Supreme Court opinions was the New York Times). 
 142 See Schacter, supra note 119, at 1024 (noting the internet’s role and the public interest to-
wards the Obergefell opinion). 
 143 See generally id. (providing a comprehensive study on the effect of audience on Obergefell’s 
style); see also PETROSKI, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that Obergefell was one of the unusual instances 
in which the rhetorical style of an opinion mattered to a wider public audience, and arguing that this 
audience affected how the justices crafted their opinions). 
 144 Schacter, supra note 119, at 1022. 
 145 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602; Schacter, supra note 119, at 1022–23. Schacter also posits that 
Justice Kennedy’s purpose in addressing a public audience was similar to Chief Justice Earl Warren 
and Justice Felix Frankfurter’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, where they intended to ad-
dress the general public. Schacter, supra note 119, at 1022–23; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE 
INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITU-
TION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 58 (1992) (noting that Chief Justice Warren 
wrote a memo to fellow members of the Court urging that the desegregation opinions be “short, read-
able by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”). 
 146 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602; Schacter, supra note 119, at 1022–23. 
 147 Schacter, supra note 119, at 1022. 
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partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not cele-
brate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.148 
The Chief Justice’s dissent explicitly addressed the celebrating public—the 
thousands of people getting married, dancing in the streets, putting a rainbow 
filter on their Facebook photo—and rebuked them.149 
II. THE LAW AND LITERATURE MOVEMENT 
The Law and Literature movement, which was born in the early 1970s 
and popular through the late twentieth century, provides one frame of reference 
for the analysis of judicial opinions.150 The movement advocated for the applica-
tion of the tools of literary theory and criticism to legal texts, and argued that 
studying literature was useful for understanding the ethical dimension of law.151 
The genesis of the Law and Literature movement is commonly traced to 
the 1973 publication of The Legal Imagination by James Boyd White.152 White 
advocated for the inclusion of the “great books” of literature in the law curricu-
lum, and argued that the tools of literary theory and criticism had something to 
bear on the study and interpretation of legal texts.153 The Legal Imagination is 
structured as a textbook for law students, interweaves legal texts with poetry 
and fiction, and gives students written assignments to complete.154 
Critics have posited that the beginning of the movement was catalyzed by 
the Law and Economics movement, the influence of late twentieth century lit-
erary theory, and the transfer of graduate students in the humanities to law 
school.155 The Law and Literature movement arose in part in reaction to the 
then-popular Law and Economics movement, which sought to apply economic 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Schacter, supra note 119, 
at 1022–23 (noting Chief Justice Roberts is explicitly addressing the public with this passage). 
 149 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Alex Dickinson, Here’s How Amer-
ica Celebrated the Supreme Court Gay Marriage Decision, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2015-06-26/here-s-how-america-celebrated-the-supreme-
court-gay-marriage-decision [https://perma.cc/K8PX-DQKY] (showing celebration after Obergefell 
was released). 
 150 GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 149 (1995) (noting that the Law and Litera-
ture movement began in 1973 with the publication of The Legal Imagination by James Boyd White). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id.; JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973). 
 153 See MINDA, supra note 150, at 149–50 (describing “great books” approach); WHITE, supra 
note 152, at xxxi–xxxv. 
 154 WHITE, supra note 152, at xxxi–xxxv. 
 155 See Peter Brooks, Literature as Law’s Other, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 349, 349–50 (2010) 
(noting the influence of the law and economics movement, literary theory, and humanities graduate 
students). 
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concepts such as efficiency and maximization to the study of law.156 In re-
sponse to an understanding of the world that worshipped efficiency, propo-
nents of Law and Literature argued the tools of literature might assist us in un-
derstanding something about what it means to be human, and argued that un-
derstanding was crucial to the study of law.157 In addition, twentieth century 
literary theory, which deals with themes of language, meaning, and semiotics, 
led legal scholars to begin to analyze their application to legal texts.158 Finally, 
around this time many graduate students in the humanities were faced with 
dismal job prospects and transferred to law school, and in doing so they 
brought the spirit of the humanities with them.159 
The Law and Literature movement has often been subdivided into two 
separate categories: law in literature and law as literature.160 The law in litera-
ture faction argued for the inclusion in the law school curriculum of literary 
classics that depicted legal proceedings, such as Kafka’s The Trial or Mel-
ville’s Billy Budd, Sailor.161 These scholars argued that the study of such litera-
ture could teach students about ethical themes that would be important to the 
practice of law.162 
In contrast, the law as literature perspective advocated for using the 
methods of literary criticism to interpret legal texts.163 These scholars were less 
concerned with literature per se, but rather with the understanding of law as a 
creative art and legal texts as “aesthetic, ethical, and political.”164 James Boyd 
White, the author of The Legal Imagination, was one of the foremost propo-
nents of the law as literature approach, and focused only secondarily on law in 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Brooks, supra note 155, at 349 (noting that the Law and Literature movement was born in 
reaction to the law and economics movement). See generally, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2012) (arguing that fundamental economic concepts such as max-
imization, equilibrium, and efficiency are essential to understanding and explaining the law). 
 157 MINDA, supra note 150, at 152. 
 158 See, e.g., IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 15 (1995) 
(noting that law journals began to publish articles about figures such as Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger, 
and Wittgenstein); Brooks, supra note 155, at 350 (calling late twentieth century literary theory an 
“export commodity”). 
 159 POSNER, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that in the 1970s many humanities graduate students 
without good job prospects went to law school); Brooks, supra note 155, at 349. 
 160 MINDA, supra note 150, at 150; WARD, supra note 158, at 3. Other scholars, however, have 
rejected the subdivision into the dichotomy of “law in literature” versus “law as literature.” See, e.g., 
Richard H. Weisberg, Family Feud: A Response to Robert Weisberg on Law and Literature, 1 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 69, 76 (1988). 
 161 See MINDA, supra note 150, at 150 (describing “great books” approach of law in literature”); 
Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1 (1988) (describing 
“law in literature” as regarding legal themes or actors in fiction or drama). 
 162 MINDA, supra note 150, at 150. 
 163 WARD, supra note 158, at 3, 16. 
 164 See, e.g., id. at 19 (noting White saw legal texts as “aesthetic, ethical, and political”); JAMES 
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW, at ix–xiv (1985) (analogizing law to drama, poetry, rhetoric, and 
narrative). 
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literature.165 White applied literary theory to the study of law, and argued that 
reading legal texts is a “shared process” similar to the study of literature.166 
White applied his theory to the analysis of judicial opinions, asking how 
we should judge the writing of legal opinions.167 In Justice as Translation, 
White analyzes the writing style of several Supreme Court opinions that fo-
cused on the rights of the disempowered.168 He looks at the way each opinion 
created community through analysis of the “Ideal Reader” it conjured.169 The 
ideal reader is not whomever the actual readers of the opinion may be, but ra-
ther, the hypothetical reader the opinion invokes—and who the opinion will 
invite its actual readers to become.170 White believed that through the implicit 
invocation of an ideal reader, legal texts—and especially judicial opinions—
could create community.171 
White exhibited his theory through close readings of Supreme Court opin-
ions.172 His reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Mary-
land demonstrates his notion that a judge must be in some sense a poet.173 
White notes that in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall is making a claim for 
the power of the judiciary by arguing that the Court can give the nation a body 
                                                                                                                           
 165 WARD, supra note 158, at 18 (noting that White was the most committed to the law as litera-
ture approach). 
 166 Id.; WHITE, supra note 19, at 91 (“I will be making a claim for the character of law itself, as a 
way of reading, comparing, and criticizing authoritative texts, and, in so doing, as a way of constitut-
ing, through conversation, a community and a culture of a certain kind.”). 
 167 WHITE, supra note 19, at xv (“My hope is to work out a way of talking about what we should 
admire and condemn in judicial opinions, which is also a way of asking more generally how we 
should criticize—how [we should] understand and judge—what judges do.”). 
 168 See id. at 102–80 (analyzing various Fourth Amendment cases as well as cases dealing with 
the Fugitive Slave Act). 
 169 Id. at 100 (“The kind of community a text creates can range from the relationship of two that 
is implied in the making of any text to a set of relationships that create a whole world.”). 
 170 Id. (defining ideal reader as “the version of himself or herself that [the opinion] asks each of 
its readers to become”). 
 171 Id. at 101 (“I am thus suggesting a way of reading a text as rhetorically constitutive: as an act 
of expression that reconstitutes its own resources of language and in doing so constitutes a communi-
ty, directly with its reader and indirectly with those others in the world about whom it speaks (or to-
wards whom it invites its reader to take one attitude or another) . . . . Is this an authoritarian text, one 
that demands simple and total obedience of its reader, or does it define the reader as a person with a 
mind, with a heart—as a free agent—who in reading the text is encouraged to activate these capacities 
in certain ways?”); James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 
TEX. L. REV. 415, 435 (1982) (“[W]e can ask what it means in a different way: how would the ideal 
reader contemplated by this document, indeed constituted by it, understand its bearing in the present 
circumstances?”). 
 172 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 94, at 153–83 (reading Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey); WHITE, supra note 19, at 141–214 (reading various Fourth Amendment cas-
es); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 231–74 (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, 
WORDS] (reading McCulloch v. Maryland). 
 173 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see WHITE, WORDS, supra note 
172, at 269 (“[T]he judge must intend to be something of a poet. He must speak as one who has some-
thing to learn.”). 
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of discourse that will unite its audience and create community.174 Further, 
Chief Justice Marshall defines the very nature of a constitution not as a lengthy 
and technical legal code, but as something intelligible to the public: Chief Jus-
tice Marshall notes, famously, that “[W]e must never forget that it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding.”175 White notes that one aspect of Justice Marshall’s 
“expounding” is his magisterial voice, in which his reasoning sounds more like 
decisive axioms.176 Finally, White looks at Chief Justice Marshall’s reading of 
the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and argues that the 
word should be understood not strictly—i.e. “absolutely necessary”—but in-
stead figuratively or in accordance with its common usage.177 White argues 
this shows that Chief Justice Marshall regards the Constitution and judicial 
opinions not as existing in a distinct sphere of life, but rather as a part of the 
culture in which they sit.178 In that sense, then, White argued that judicial opin-
ions can work to constitute a community.179 
Another emphasis of the Law and Literature movement has been on liter-
ature’s ability to teach empathy, and that this empathy creates better law-
yers.180 For example, Professor Martha Nussbaum argued that one can engage 
in “poetic judging” by recounting the facts of a case in an empathetic way, be-
cause it gives the reader an opportunity to genuinely imagine what it would 
feel like to be in the plaintiff’s shoes.181 Nussbaum argued that the incorpora-
tion of literature into the legal curriculum would teach students the empathy 
necessary to engage in this work.182 
As popular as the Law and Literature movement was, it was not without 
its critics.183 Judge Richard Posner famously critiqued the movement—
specifically the law in literature contingent—arguing the legal and literary 
texts should be read in fundamentally different ways, and that conflating the 
two would add no value to our understanding of the law.184 Judge Posner did, 
however, find some merit in the law as literature segment, and noted that a 
                                                                                                                           
 174 WHITE, WORDS, supra note 172, at 251. 
 175 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407; WHITE, WORDS, supra note 172, at 255. 
 176 WHITE, WORDS, supra note 172, at 256. 
 177 Id. at 260. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 271. 
 180 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUB-
LIC LIFE 99–121 (1995) (arguing that thinking of people’s lives with the specificity and empathy of a 
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 181 Id. (analyzing two opinions that are successful examples of poetic judging). 
 182 Id. at 11–12. 
 183 See infra notes 184–188 and accompanying text. 
 184 POSNER, supra note 50, at 302 (“The literary should be a sphere apart.”); WARD, supra note 
158, at 11–12 (describing Posner’s attack on law and literature theorists); Brooks, supra note 155, at 
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whereas “literary criticism should be free to construe texts in a ‘New Critical’ manner”). 
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more valuable direction for the Law and Literature movement would be the 
literary analysis of judicial opinions.185 Academic Robert Weisberg echoed and 
expanded upon Judge Posner’s critique, arguing that the Law and Literature 
movement was unduly precious, and that a judge’s deftness with language did 
not necessarily correlate with a deftness in making moral judgments.186 Indeed, 
he argued that a well-described plaintiff or recitation of the facts might not on-
ly be irrelevant to the ethical issues in the case, but that by creating the impres-
sion of a just decision, it might disguise a decision lacking sound reasoning.187 
Weisberg also argued that White’s work was ahistorical and did not adequately 
address the power relations within which each category of texts is written.188 
Other critics worried that Law and Literature might be unduly academic, 
and not adequately take on power dynamics or genuine political struggles.189 
Indeed, according to some, this is what became of the movement: it provoked 
excitement and debate between legal scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, but ul-
timately failed to effect any substantive change in the legal world and was rel-
egated to the halls of academia.190 The movement had fractured, unable to 
identify a common purpose or agenda.191 In recent years, though, some schol-
ars have attempted to resurrect the movement, noting despite the follies and 
missteps it took in the past, the general thrust of the movement and its concern 
with textual interpretation is still relevant.192 
                                                                                                                           
 185 POSNER, supra note 50, at 17. Robert Weisberg noted that the analysis of judicial rhetoric was 
the one area where Posner “falls prey to the preciousness of the general run of law-and-literature writ-
ing that he otherwise so properly criticizes.” Weisberg, supra note 161, at 37 n.126. 
 186 To illustrate this point, Weisberg describes Cardozo’s writing. Weisberg, supra note 161, at 
38. Cardozo’s style has often been praised, but Weisberg argues that “align[ing] linguistic precision 
with sensitivity to moral value . . . is not a compellingly necessary alignment.” Id. He pointed out that 
abstract moral reasoning could display just as much as, if not more, ethical power. Id. 
 187 Id. at 39–40. 
 188 Id. at 54–55. 
 189 WARD, supra note 158, at 11 (describing West’s critique of Law and Literature as “a distrac-
tion from real political struggles”); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 96 (1993) (not-
ing that the Law and Literature movement does not engage in “a truly radical critique of power”). 
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creasingly pretentious and ultimately useless language which, rather than educating, serves only to 
mystify and then to alienate all but the most fervent of believers.” WARD, supra note 158, at 22. 
 191 See Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 
1059, 1061–62 (1999) (arguing that the Law and Literature movement has become so fractured so as 
to “undermine itself from within”). 
 192 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 155, at 349, 352–53 (noting that despite the fact that the move-
ment had “strayed from its most productive paths of inquiry” it should nonetheless matter, and apply-
ing its principles to an interpretation of the “torture memo” as well as several recent Supreme Court 
cases). 
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III. A LAW AND LITERATURE READING OF OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 
The Law and Literature movement provides a fitting framework with 
which to analyze Obergefell v. Hodges because it brings style to the fore-
front.193 Much of the tension between the majority opinion and the dissents of 
Obergefell is explicitly about style.194 Justice Scalia analogized Justice Kenne-
dy’s opinion to “the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.”195 Even the 
more level-headed Chief Justice Roberts accused the majority opinion of hid-
ing behind “shiny rhetorical gloss.”196 Therefore, to understand what Oberge-
fell means, one must not solely analyze the substantive impact of the decision, 
but also the style.197 In Section A of this Part, I engage in a Law and Literature 
reading of Obergefell, and I examine the relationship the opinion creates with 
both the plaintiffs and the audience.198 In Section B, I examine the implications 
of the Obergefell style.199 
A. The Relationships Obergefell Creates with the Plaintiffs and Its Readers 
Legal scholar James Boyd White argues that it is not the paraphraseable 
message of an opinion that is most important, but rather the experience of 
reading it creates through its style.200 Under White’s rubric, then, what experi-
ence does Obergefell create for its reader?201 White looks at two sets of rela-
tionships an opinion creates: the relationship with the people the opinion talks 
about, and the relationship with the opinion’s reader.202 
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First, the facts section of Obergefell creates an empathetic relationship 
with the people it describes: the plaintiffs.203 Obergefell was the consolidation 
of multiple lower-court cases from states that did not allow same-sex mar-
riage.204 Justice Kennedy’s recitation of the facts from the lower-court cases 
exhibits his empathy towards the petitioners, and therefore enacts what Profes-
sor Martha Nussbaum called “poetic judging.”205 Justice Kennedy’s descrip-
tion of the named petitioner’s circumstances merits quoting at length: 
Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in the Ohio case, met John 
Arthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a life to-
gether, establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011, however, 
Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. 
This debilitating disease is progressive, with no known cure. Two 
years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to commit to one another, 
resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual prom-
ise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage 
was legal. It was difficult for Arthur to move, and so the couple 
were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained on the tar-
mac in Baltimore. Three months later, Arthur died. Ohio law does 
not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Ar-
thur’s death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even 
in death, a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems “hurtful for 
the rest of time.”206 
Petitioner Obergefell’s story is heart-wrenching: he and his partner of twenty 
years were married on a medical transport plane three months before his part-
ner’s death.207 Justice Kennedy’s rendition of their experience both shows his 
own empathy toward the petitioners, as well as elicits empathy from the read-
er.208 
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Second, Obergefell’s style conjures an “ideal reader” much like the one 
White theorized.209 White uses the hypothetical “ideal reader” as a method of 
understanding the meaning of an opinion.210 The ideal reader is the version of 
the reader, not as she is, but as the text invites her to become.211 By identifying 
the ideal reader of an opinion, for example, White argues, we can learn some-
thing about the text itself.212 He argues that the relationship the text establishes 
between itself and its readers also serves to create a textual community among 
its readers.213 
Thus, who is the ideal reader conjured by Obergefell? As discussed in 
Part I, Justice Kennedy seemed to have a particular concern with audience.214 
And yet Obergefell is not apparently written in the “plain language” that legal 
scholars posit is most intelligible to the non-legal audience.215 Indeed, it is 
written in a lofty style, speaking of “the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devo-
tion, sacrifice, and family.”216 It is akin to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions of 
the eighteenth century, in which the justice spoke as the “mouthpiece of divini-
ty.”217 It is not written in the more casual, “impure” style that critics assert will 
resonate with popular audiences.218 One of Justice Kennedy’s former clerks, 
Professor Michael Dorf, posited that the Justice might have better achieved his 
goal of connecting with non-lawyers if he wrote not in lofty rhetoric but in 
plain English.219 
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Professor Dorf, though, does not account for the simple fact that the 
Obergefell opinion did connect with countless non-specialists.220 His hypothe-
sis seems to be based on the principle that non-lawyers do not like magisterial 
rhetoric.221 But Justice Kennedy does not subscribe to that idea.222 James Boyd 
White drew attention to the line in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, in which the Court states: 
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people 
to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and po-
litical pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choic-
es that the Court is obliged to make.223 
With this passage, the Court is aware of the need for public acceptance of its 
decisions, especially in controversial cases.224 It hypothesizes that the public 
will accept a decision if it sees it as a principled one, not the product of politi-
cal compromise.225 That is the same wager Justice Kennedy makes in Oberge-
fell.226 He writes to an ideal reader who respects a decision made on principle: 
in this case, on the lofty principle that marriage can make two people into 
something greater than they were individually.227 
B. Implications of Justice Kennedy’s Magisterial Style 
Obergefell models White’s ideal of building community through language 
by laying bare its principled decision making.228 In Justice as Translation, 
White analyzed a series of Supreme Court opinions and pointed out the ways 
that justices often avoid the difficulties of judging by resting their opinions on 
false grounds of authority.229 As examples of what could be “false authority,” 
he cites original intention, plain meaning of a statute, the clear commands of 
precedent, the facts of a case.230 In other words—many of the things we typi-
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cally think about when practicing law.231 He argues that these grounds can be 
ways to avoid the real responsibilities of judging: that of creating an ethical 
relationship both with prior texts and with people in the world.232 Justice Ken-
nedy, then, writes to an ideal reader who is not won over by a three- or four-
part test.233 He wagers a bet that such tests will not forge a connection.234 It is 
not that he is eluding traditional legal analysis, but it is that he worries that 
such analysis can tend to evade something more fundamental about the princi-
pled choice the Court is making.235 
But is White’s ideal—and Justice Kennedy’s opinion—even something 
judges should strive for? On the one hand, Obergefell did build community in 
a real way: all those likes and shares on social media indicated more than just 
clickable content.236 They were people engaging with the text, giving life to the 
opinion, saying this is not just some stuffy legalese that will never see the light 
of day outside the Supreme Court Reporter.237 Marginalized people were able 
to read a text handed down by our nation’s highest court and genuinely see 
themselves in it.238 It is possible that this community-building function is more 
than feel-good, but could affect the life of an opinion: in the four years since 
Obergefell was released, talk of overturning it has all but dissolved.239 
On the other hand, though, it may be naively optimistic to think that beau-
tiful writing can change the world—or even want it to.240 The nascent legiti-
macy studies field has shown that the style of an opinion only has an effect on 
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those who already agree with its holding; it does nothing to change the hearts 
or minds of those who disagree with it.241 Further, pointing to pretty language 
does little to defend against charges of judicial activism.242 And most im-
portantly, we should be wary of the potential for, and history of, appeals to 
emotion being used to produce dangerous results.243 
But before reaching the question of whether beautiful writing in Supreme 
Court opinions is a laudable goal, we cannot forget to ask: is Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion beautiful—or even good—writing? This is necessarily a question of 
taste, but this Note would not be complete without offering my personal 
view.244 I was among those, on June 26, 2015, who were genuinely moved by 
the opinion’s final paragraph when it showed up on my Facebook feed.245 On 
the other hand, I cringed a couple years later, when as a 1L I sat down to read 
the whole decision, and found the line: “Marriage responds to the universal 
fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there.”246 This is 
law? I thought. 
It is hard to write in a serious way about the meaning of life. And it is 
easy to tear down those who do it badly. But if law is seeking to regulate any-
thing as monumental as one’s right to marry,247 to have an abortion,248 to en-
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gage in sexual intimacy,249 to die250—the important moments of one’s life—it 
cannot reduce them to math, and think that the reader will be fooled simply 
because it gives an air of technical precision.251 We cannot forget, “it is a con-
stitution we are expounding.”252 And Justice Kennedy knows that.253 
CONCLUSION 
Though neither the Constitution nor statute requires the Supreme Court to 
issue written opinions, they have become part of the fabric of our legal com-
munity. Over time, the dominant style of Court opinions has evolved from the 
magisterial tone of Chief Justice John Marshall, to the so-called “law-review” 
style condemned by critics. Fundamental rights cases present a singular stylis-
tic challenge, both because they require the justice to reduce some ineffable 
right or liberty to words and because they often present cases of public im-
portance. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy sought to describe the fundamental 
importance of marriage, and critics chastised him for using overwrought lan-
guage. The Law and Literature movement, which was at its peak in the late 
twentieth century, provides an appropriate lens through which to examine 
Obergefell. Obergefell exemplifies the Law and Literature ideal because the 
decision uses language to generate empathy and build community. 
ELIZA S. WALKER 
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